wrongdoing than other State officials -or such proceedings are rather prevented by international law. Or under a different perspective: is it possible under international law to advocate that foreign judicial activity cannot be the reason for a prosecution and trial?
Being unable to conduct a comprehensive sociological and criminological investigation about the dimension of judicial involvement with the commission of crimes, this paper focuses rather on possible legal reasons for the rarity of "trialing foreign judges" situations.
deprived of such effects and consequences or not considered as a requirements for the subsequent enforcement of domestic law.
Decisions aimed at shielding individuals from their responsibility under international and domestic law may be deprived of so called "negative effects" (ne bis in idem) otherwise preventing a criminal proceeding (if the principle is established under domestic law) 5 . Whilst denial of requests based upon human rights obligations and constitutional requirements, are the ordinary reaction to a foreign proceeding violating fundamental principles, only exceptionally such proceedings and decisions are legally qualified under the laws of the requested State as legally "void" 6 . Foreign decisions civilian matters sometimes, when not directly relevant due to conflicts of laws and foreign laws applicable to the subject matter, are to a wider extent than decisions in criminal matters considered under domestic law directly enforceable. In the above referred situations, decisions may be challenged in proceedings (if established under domestic law) aimed at enforcing foreign decisions (exequatur proceedings) or in proceedings established in order to provide a remedy against foreign decisions. Foreign corrupt judicial practices have on their own led episodically to a restrictive interpretation of the so called forum non conveniens doctrine, privileging the assertion of otherwise "improper" jurisdiction, instead of remitting the parties to foreign courts. Further, practice shows that court decisions in civilian matters (which may well be instrumental to racial discrimination and other grave breaches through denial of civil rights, denial of justice as such and among others to targeted decisions on losses of parental rights and adoptions) may be challenged at the normative level or through court decisions.
Specific legal remedies may be established through proper legislation in respect of widespread situations as in case of debellatio and cessation of military occupation, reunifications and also national reconciliations processes in which certain judgments determining unwanted (or also unacceptable) consequences are per tabulas deprived of its legal effects, subject to specific remedies to include reopening of the case and removal of the decision, amnesties and pardon. Accordingly all decisions and sentences of the "special tribunal for the defense of the State" established during the fascist regime in Italy have been deprived of legal effects by decree n. 159 adopted in 1944 by the 5
This happens under international criminal procedure, for example, as a matter of "complementary" under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or as a corollary of the "primacy" of the ICTR and the ICTY. In inter-State relations, denial of negative effects of foreign decisions (once such effect is ordinarily recognized under domestic law, as there are no prescriptive norms of international law), is still a matter to be addressed de lege ferenda.
Lieutenant of Reign. Special provisions can be found in the law about the removal of decisions adopted under the Nazi regime 7 and in the laws adopted subsequently to the German reunification for the rehabilitation of those convicted 8 . The above mentioned remedies are aimed at operating "on the decision" by taking into consideration, declaring and stigmatizing procedural and substantial lacks and eventually human rights violations without naming those responsible and with an otherwise unimaginable levity in asserting the guilt but not naming those guilty.
Criminal proceedings against judges and prosecutors focuses on those charged with an offence as a consequence of a decision (when the decision is in direct causal connection with the event constituting the offence, and the mean by which the offence is committed), as a consequence of a miscarriage or denial of justice. Conceptually close to such measures are those measures adopted in respect of certain foreign proceeding not in order to prevent their enforcement, but to apply certain (non criminal) sanctions to those responsible as in the recent so called "Magnitsky rule of law accountability act" 9 .
Practice's overview
International practice shows that prosecution of foreign judges and prosecutors, when occurred, was mainly in connection to core crimes or widespread violation of human rights. Jurisdiction was mostly exercised based upon territoriality principle, by occupying forces or by national courts after a situation of occupation had come to an end.
Similarly the German post-reunification trials -which despite being based upon a constitutional process show some "conflict of laws" profile approximating it to international practice 10 -are based upon the territoriality principle. It remains nevertheless questionable to what extent such practice may contribute to the subject matter of judicial criminal liability under international law and the comments in this paragraph are not aimed at addressing the troubled issue of the nature of the German reunification 11 .
7 NS-AufhG.
8 Str-RehaG. 9 H.R. 6156, definitively signed by United States President on 14 of December 2012.
Subsequently, eleven among judges and prosecutors have been black-listed.
10
Many of the principles outlined since the reunification agreements in the relevant statutes show an attitude towards the nulla poena sine lege and the lex mitior principle we would like to notice in purely international issues, but are rather based upon a strong realiance on constitutional principles and consequently embodied in par. 315 of the introductory law to the penal code (Einfürungsgesetz zum Strafgesetzbuch, EGStGB). Defendants of different ranks were charged as authority convening a court martial, judges sitting in the said court and jailer for having, in violation of the laws and customs of war, respectively denied the status of prisoners of war, tried and sentenced through a Japanese court martial eight named members of U.S. Forces and executed the said sentence. The Japanese trial was conducted based on ex post facto "enemy airmen law". All the U.S. airmen were convicted and three were executed whilst a fourth died during captivity. In the subsequent U.S. trial the military commission found all four Japanese officers guilty, even if it felt compelled by "unusual strong mitigating consideration" applicable to each of the accused in various degree.
Whilst the role of the highest in rank was defined in accordance with ordinary pattern for "command responsibility", in determining the extent to which two of the defendants sitting as judges in the Japanese court martial were accessories to the war crime, the U.S. military commission held that the judge with legal training (Yusei Wako) was guilty of having "had before him purported confessions of the American fliers and other evidence obtained and furnished by the military police headquarters in Tokyo ... he ... accepted the evidence without question and tried and adjudged the prisoners on the evidence which was false and fraudulent". However in voting the death penalty, the military commission held that he was "obeying special instructions from his superiors", mitigating but not excluding responsibility. Perhaps the legal cultural background of the components of the U.S. military commission could explain the sensibility towards fair trial issues 13 and adjudging on statements obtained under duress on one side, and the less severe finding in respect of the, in our view not less, outrageous "directed" sentencing. The other accused sitting as a judge in the Japanese court martial (Ryuhei Okada) was found guilty as he "enjoyed freedom of conscience as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoners" but "he adjudged them guilty". Also he was obeying special instructions in voting the death penalty. The single aspects the mentioned defendants were found guilty pertain to the very core of the merits of the trial and despite being framed as accessory to the war crime (denial of prisoners of war status and the denial of a fair trial not qualified by a violation of the applicable procedural law), and may be evidence of the fact that no "privileged judicial discretion" was recognized in the said case. 
13
The airmen were tried without defense counsel and without interpretation of the proceedings into English and were not afforded with opportunity to defend themselves.
permitting and participating in a false trial against fourteen U.S. airmen which were sentenced to death 14 . The highest in rank permitted directed, authorized, according to the charges, an "illegal unwarranted and unfair trial" against American prisoners of war. Those defendants acting as judges (Sogiura and Fujikama) were additionally accused for their "willful failure to perform their duties and failure and neglect to provide a fair trial". The reference to the duties of judges is perhaps the most relevant development since the previous Sawada trial.
The Australian military court in Rabaul the 20th -23rd March 1946, tried Sergeant Major Shigeru Ohashi and six other, for the execution of civilians, upon summary trials held under authority delegated to unit commanders to proceed on the spot not convening a court martial 15 . In the given case in which, under exceptional circumstances, soldiers exercised or better invoked judicial functions, the Australian military court made of the fair trial issue a pivotal questions. Nevertheless the vague judicial character of extraordinary summary trials by low ranked lay soldiers, resembles more those situations in which executions took place without prior trial, like in the so called Sandrock case 16 . 3.2 French trial upon German judicial activity in occupied zones. On 3rd May 1946, the (French) "Permanent Military Tribunal in Strasbourg" decided the case France against Wagner and other six defendants 17 responsible for the civil administration under German occupation, charged inter alia for the systematic recruitment of French citizens from Alsace to serve against France and abuse of legal process resulting in judicial murder. Two of the defendants vested with prosecutorial functions (Luger and Semar) and the former president of the German special court established in Strasbourg (Huber) were specifically charged, together with others as accomplices in premeditated murder as an ordinary offence under the French penal code.
The former judge was specifically charged for having pronounced objectionable death sentences trialed in absentia. He was allegedly prone, through the prosecutor, to the orders of Chief of civil administration (Wagner) concerning the trials. Allegations referred also to "judicial murder" strictu senso and specifically to death penalty inflicted in two specific court cases.
The first one was the so called "Witz case" concerning the possession of arms by a juvenile. In the case the prosecution refrained from asking the death penalty, which was "ordered" by the head of the civil administration. The second one is known as the "Ballersdorf case"
18 and was a case of group attempt to leave France. Apparently during and adjournment of the trial the judge and the prosecutor met with the head of the civilian administration and soon after 13 out of the 14 defendants were convicted to death and executed by the SS the following day. The trial against the fourteeenth defendant which was a mentally insane juvenile was discontinued and the defendant, as asserted in response to a German inquiry, allegedly died in a concentration camp. Nevertheless, it appeared that he had been executed together with other accused.
One of the defendants formerly carrying out prosecutorial functions (Luger) was held to have acted upon superior order and although not an absolute defense, acquitted, whereas the trial against the former against the other prosecutor was spit as he had fled in U.S. occupied zone, and we found no information about it. Perhaps the perceived role of the prosecutor within the French legal system may have influenced to some extent the outcome of the trial.
The accused formerly discharging judicial functions (Huber) was deemed not having acted under superior orders and convicted in absentia.
Whilst the "Witz case" was essentially a matter of interference in the judicial process resulting in a politically driven decision, the "Ballersdorf case" appears to be -at least in reference to the charges brought against those formerly vested with prosecutorial and judicial functions -a matter of ordinary offenses under criminal law. An abuse of legal process was consequently construed as a matter of denial of fair trail and violations of the applicable (foreign) procedural law, which happened to be the law of the German occupant.
Nevertheless, the France against Wagner case doesn't show any specific criminal charge for judicial misconduct or perversion of the course of justice as a "pre-requisite" for a conviction for murder. This is perhaps also a result of the fact that the case did not involve any conflict of laws issue and also a result of dogmatic difficulties, under continental criminal law, to justify the punishment of the violations of foreign law pertaining to the exercise of foreign official functions, to include judicial functions.
3.3 The "Justice case" In the so called "Justice case", United States v. Altstötter, one of the descending Nurnberg trials, decided the 4 of December 1947 19 , certain German jurists were charged with conspiracy, war crimes, crimes against humanity and participation in a criminal
18
Prosecution concerned a group attempt to leave France and to reach Switzerland, the defendants were able to read the indictment and to communicate with the defense counsel when the trial had already started in flagrant violation of applicable German law, whilst two juveniles were not examined prior to the trial in order to establish if they could be held liable for the offense. 20 . Some of the defendants in charge of ministerial functions were responsible of the review of court decisions and had in certain cases the power to order a retrial (so called "nullity plea" and "extraordinary objection") and, in specific circumstances, were responsible for the confirmation of sentences.
Nevertheless, for purpose of the present paper we will focus on those accused of having discharged strictly prosecutorial and judicial functions in order to verify which are the "criminal markers" of a judicial activity under international law. This requires the additional premise that in the Altstötter and others case, the tribunal didn't consider any specific judgment as a "charge", but rather as a piece of evidence of the guilt of the accused having concurred to it even if certain German decisions are specifically dealt in the opinion of the Tribunal and have been produced by the accused as exhibits.
This said, we can move to those references to specific court cases quoted in those parts of the opinion of the tribunal concerning the accused formerly vested with prosecutorial and judicial functions.
According to the tribunal, defendant Lautz, former Chief Prosecutor at the People's court (Volksgerichshof) retained specific responsibility for carring out prosecutions for undermining the German defensive strength, high treason and treason and attempted escape from the territory of the Reich 21 . The opinion of the tribunal quotes also cases involving Poles attempting to escape from the territory of the Reich. In one of such cases, the so called "Ledwon case" a Pole was tried the 10 August 1942 for having tried to flee from the territory of the Reich into Switzerland and struck a custom officer attempting to stop him. The indictment asserts he was attempting to join the "Polish legion" in Switzerland. The tribunal observed that the accused permitted the charge of high treason of ridiculous nature, and affirmed the case to lay down the "sinister subtlety of the Nazi procedure" 22 consisting in the framing of the charges, by adding the charge of high treason, in order to assert the jurisdiction of the People's court, otherwise non competent
20
In detail, defendants Bernickel and Lautz were respectively senior and chief prosecutor at the People's court (Volksgerichshof). The first was acquitted, the later sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. Nebelung and Petersen, both acquitted, were respectively Chief justice at the fourth senate and lay judge in the first and in the special senate of the People's court. Oeschey, sentenced to lifetime imprisonment was judge and the Chief justice at the Special court (Sondergerichtshof) in Nurnberg, whilst his predecessor in the position Rothaug, equally sentenced to imprisonment for lifetime, had subsequently discharged the duties of Senior public prosecutor at the People's court. Finally Joel, Chief public prosecutor at Hamm was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and Cuhorst, acquitted due to the destruction upon an allied air raid of the archives of the Special court in Stuttgart was Chief justice at the said court.
21
Ibid., p. 1120.
22
Ibid., p. 1123.
to trial under the sole law against Poles and Jews. The accused Ledwon was sentenced to death. The tribunal held that this and other similar cases based on what appears to be a "prosecutorial scheme" in order to add through the "polish legion element" a shadow of high treason on ordinary attempts to leave the territory of the Reich 23 , the former Chief prosecutor made himself guilty of "participating in the national program of racial extermination of Poles by means of the perversion of the law of high treason"
24 . The parts of the opinion concerning the accused Lautz also refer to the call for the application by analogy of § 91 of the German penal code and the provision of high treason against the Reich in a situations in which a Polish national had, before the war, exposed a "racial German" (not a "German national" at the time of the conduct) to a serious detriment 25 . Specific circumstances of judicial misconduct are listed in the parts of the opinion related to the accused Rothaug as presiding judge of the Special court in Nurnberg. References were made to the "Durka and Struss" case in which two Polish girls aged 17 were expeditiously put on trial for having allegedly started a fire and sentenced to death under the ordinance against Poles and Jews. The military tribunal held that the defendant could not have established the facts form available evidence 26 and further that, as the age of the two girls was not disputed, they would have been prosecuted under the German Juvenile Act and would neither be subject to trial before a Special court nor to capital punishment 27 . Whilst the first remark pertains to the core of judicial discretion in judicial 
24
In two further similar case quoted in the opinion of the Tribunal, three Poles were sentenced to death and the opinion of the People's court and the indictment were included as exhibit for the prosecution (Respectively Pros. Ex. 129 and 136) and also the so called "Kalicki case" tried on indictment although non personally signed by the former Chief prosecutor Lautz, led to the application of the death penalty. Another accused, Rothenberger decided not to exercise the right of pardon in the last case (ibid., p. 1124). In all this cases the equally unsubstantiated intent of the victims to join the Polish legion in Switzerland was the key for a trial by the People's court and a charge for treason.
25
Ibid., p. 1125. Prosecution exhibit no. 347 was represented by a letter of the accused Lautz quoting preliminary proceedings which had come to his hands include proceeding "11J 8/42 g vs. Golek". In the said proceeding, "the defendant, a former Polish national, of the Polish ethnic group, in the years of 1938 and 1939 in Poland handed over to the Polish authorities his friend, the ethnic German Leo Hardt, of Polish nationality, by accusing him wrongly of treason in favor of the Reich and by concealing in the latter's house a Polish army regulation book for the purpose of incriminating him. As a result of this action of Golek, Hardt was condemned to 6 years of imprisonment for espionage in favor of Germany".
26
Ibid., p. 1147.
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In our view the Tribunal's intent was to stigmatize the violations of all rules, to include those established under German law. The issue of juveniles doesn't seem to have been specifically addressed in the prosecution of German judges and prosecutors as, also allied courts prosecuted juveniles without specific safeguards like in the trials of Oenning and Nix by a British Military Court in Borken, Germany, fact finding, but under circumstances in which there was no real intent to establish the truth of the facts, the second remark doesn't seem as to really express the tribunals concern with the rights of juveniles -as such rights where established solely under German domestic laws and violated in the specific circumstance. The opinion also quoted the Lopata case in which a Polish farmhand 28 was sentenced the 29 October 1942 to death under the ordinance against Poles and Jews by the Special courts for having made indecent advances to the wife of his employer. The special courts get involved following a nullity plea filed before the Reich's supreme court 29 for the quashing of the first conviction to imprisonment by the district court 30 . The tribunal stigmatized strongly the alleged violation of the "fundamental principles of justice that no man should be tried twice for the same offence" and the remark seems to be slightly out of focus 31 . Despite the general character of what was perceived as a violation of double jeopardy the infamous character of review mechanisms emerges from its discriminatory use against non German accused 32 and the anomalous "secret hearings" held by the Reich's supreme court.
The enforcement of discriminatory laws has also been asserted by the tribunal in respect of the Kaminska and Wdowen case, dealt as presiding judge by the accused Oeshey. The same accused, presiding a civil court martial, was also responsible in the "Count Montgelas case" in which a German citizen was charged, tried and sentenced to death for his insulting remarks against 
31
The remark perhaps is the very reason of a long lasting misunderstanding about the alleged acceptance by "international courts" of the double jeopardy principle. The remarks were referred to a national procedure and strictly it was not a matter of double jeopardy (charges were unfortunately different) and conviction was not definitive. The prosecution referred to the same case by observing that "the protection against double jeopardy, keystone of criminal procedure the world over, was abrogated and used for the murder of civilians of occupied countries" ibid., p. 87.
32
According to the Prosecution, ibid., p. was notified of the trial after the accused was already convicted and shot. The tribunal, while observing that prosecution for remarks hostile to the Nazi regime may not constitute a violation of Control Council Law n. 10, taken into account the circumstances and the manner in which the victim was brought to trial and tried and the fact that the trial was "a last vengeful act of political persecution", held that the case would fall under the mentioned Control Council Law. The responsibilities of the accused Rothaug are further defined with reference to the Katzenberger case, in which the ancient head of the Jewish community in Nurnberg was sentenced to death for the offence or "racial pollution" due to an intimate relation with a German lady, allegedly committed under special aggravating circumstances set out in provisions about "crimes committed during air raids" and "exploitation of state of war"
34 . The case initially dealt by the ordinary criminal divisional court was moved to the Special court and a new indictment was filed. In order to preclude the examination of a witness for the defendant the new indictment was joined against her for perjury "contrary to established practice"
35 . Prior to the trial, Rothaug as a judge stated to the medical expert in the case that the Katzenberger "would be beheaded anyhow". He further "tried with all his powers to encourage the witnesses to make incriminating statements against the defendants". The prosecutor was told by the Presiding judge that he expected the prosecution to ask for a death sentence and a term of imprisonment for the co-defendant. The opinion of the Special court explain the consideration which guided the decision and refer to a "grave attack on the purity of German blood". The tribunal affirmed to have "gone to some extent into the evidence of this case to show the nature of the proceedings and the animus" of the defendant Rothaug which was the presiding judge, and hold that the case was an "act of furtherance of the Nazi program to prosecute and exterminate Jews" 36 and further that the "said trials lacked the essential elements of legality" and "in 
Subsequent German proceedings
Without any intention to engage in the debate about how and to what extent Germany after the second world war reacted to crimes committed by judges and prosecutors under the former Nazi regime, in our view such practice is of international character exclusively as long as such proceedings were conducted under the applicability of the Control Council Law n. 10 which was in force until the 31 st of August 1951, and unfortunately there is no practice.
An exception is perhaps represented by the decision of the Landgericht Braunschweig of the 21.08.1950 not to drop the trial against the components of a Special court responsible of the conviction and sentencing to death of a Jewish defendant. The court held that the ascertainment of decisional dynamics among the three judges which composed the Special courts and even the questioning in this sense "would represent an inadmissible intrusion in the sphere of the professional secrecy protected by the law" 37 . Accordingly it would have been impossible to establish which of the judges had agree to the decision. The Oberlandesgericht rejected the motion for the review of the decision of 12 July 1951.
It is nevertheless worth observing that it was in this historic period that the famous case of the "grudge informant" -still agitating the infinite debate about the conflict between law and justice happened to be decided 38 . As it is known the informant was convicted and sentenced for having set in motion a judicial proceeding in which judges, which were never punished for, under the absolute compulsion of a positivist raptus pulled the trigger of a deadly law.
All subsequent proceedings were based upon violations of German law and specifically the offence of "Perverting the course of justice" (Rechtsbeugung) 39 whose ascertainment needed to be preliminary or contextual to other offences (e.g. manslaughter rather than murder and deprivation of liberty) the accused was charged with.
3. imprisonment which was considered to be "unacceptably disproportioned to the gravity of the offence" 40 . The subsequent German reunification appears us to be characterized -at least in respect of transitional provisions for the application of criminal law, more than in respect of other branches of law -by the adoption of those kinds of safeguards which are normally to be found in international processes. Whereas the above quoted prereunification cases were judged at a stage in which FRG substantive law had not yet differentiated too much from GDR laws, in judging later conduct, the courts had to confront with the issue of double criminal liability and subsequently to apply the lex mitior, but also to interpret the statutes of the GDR whose they were accused to have misapplied.
At this purpose it has been affirmed that, as GDR judgments were adopted within a different legal system, the underlying statutes were to be interpreted in accordance with the principles and the jurisprudence as well as taking into considerations instructions and directions eventually issued for the application of the said statutes, unless they were to be disregarded as gravely in breach un fundamental principles and values 41 . Several criminal proceedings have been started and most of them discontinued without filing of charges by the prosecution. Pattern for criminal responsibility have been developed by the German federal court which has identified requirements for criminal liability in the violation, with knowledge, of statutes of the GDR (Űberdehnung des Straftatbestandes in respect of penal law, otherwise defined as Offensichliches Unrecht), and specifically in the exceeding the statutory framework, the intolerable disproportion between the gravity of the fact and the sentence, as well as in the arbitrary exploitation of legal lacunas and in the violation of universally recognized human rights, in such a gross way to fulfill the requirements of arbitrariness (Willkür). The Constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) adopted a slightly different definition which was no longer related with the arbitrariness, but with the intolerable nature of the Human rights violations 42 . Subsequently the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof) further restricted the punishment in respect of those cases in which judges and prosecutors had exceeded in the application of statutory provisions, excluding the "intent" to pervert the course of justice, in those cases in which the application of the relevant laws was not as such a
40
The lower court, had held that the former Oberrichter in the GDR lacked technically the quality of a judge as he was not afforded with judicial independence and was subject to directions of its superiors. On appeal the Bundesgerichtshof pointed out that the offence of Rechtsbeugung (perverting the course of justice) may well be committed by an official and does not require responsible for the enforcement of the law.
41
In the above sense, see the decisions of the Bundesgerchtshof in BGHSt, 40, 40ff., 40, 177ff., clarifying that in interpreting the statutes of the GDR the criteria to be followed are those of the GDR and not those FRG.
42
Decision of April 7th 1998, in Neue Justiz, 1998, p. 314 ff.
grotesque departure from the law. Even evidently wrong charges against accused have been justified as within the borders o possible interpretation of the law 43 . This further development closes the distances in respect of purely domestic proceedings in which a wrong application of the law does not fulfill as such the requirements of a punishable offence. Further the extent to which human rights violations have been taken into account has not shifted from an almost exclusive focus on the right to life, in order to include those cases in which the purpose of imprisonment was to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
This patterns were used to distinguish criminal conduct from the otherwise non punishable application of political and "unjust" criminal laws" of the GDR. Accordingly, the sentencing to death penalty of political opponents in the absence of a statutory sentencing framework 44 was held to fulfill the above mentioned requirement for punishment, as the conduct took place after the 1948 Universal Human Rights Declaration 45 . At the opposite, the use of criminal laws in order to carry out economic reforms through the application of criminal sanctions (forfeiture) to an hotel owner found guilty of the possession of coal, foodstuff and so on in order to expropriate them of their belongings, in the framework of an spoliation plot vested as criminal inquiry named "Aktion Rose" was deemed as such not to violate formal GDR laws, whilst the sentencing to imprisonment jointly with the forfeiture was judged to fulfill the requirements for a criminal deprivation of liberty and a perverting of the course of justice as such punishment were disproportionate in respect of the conduct of the accused 46 .
43 Accordingly the judges having sentenced a citizen to imprisonment for one year and six months for having exposed a writing asserting that GDR borders had nothing to do with a contribution to peace, under the offence of having unduly influenced the activity of State of social bodies, were held not punishable by the Bundesgerichtshof , in Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1995, p.67, which denied the judges has internationally misapplied a criminal provisions in order to arbitrary deprive of his liberty the individual. In a further case the Bundesgerichtshof acquitted a former prosecutor which had charged a citizen with incitement against the State, as freedom of opinion and expression was ultimately protected in the GDR only in exceptional circumstances. 417ff., rejecting the individual claim for the violation of Constitutional rights (Verfassungsklage). The accused's appeal against the conviction jointly for "manslaughter" and "perverting the course of justice" and the sentencing to 3 years and 6 months imprisonment, had been previously rejected by the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), in Neue Justiz, 1996, p. 154.
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Bundesgerichtshof, decision of July, 9th 1998 (in Juristische Rundschau, 2000, p. 246 ff.), holding that the accused, which had at the time of the conduct prosecutorial functions, convincted in first instance was to be discharged as he had acted in accordance with laws enacted at the time in the GDR. The court also held that if such statutes from an actual viewpoint raise human rights concerns, in the context of a post war economy they did not contrast with a "supra -positive" law. Nevertheless the court held that he was guilty as co-author as the judges convicting hotel owner with the aim to expropriate them exceeded the Similarly, the application of objectively unjust, and incompatible with the principle of a State based upon the rule of law, provisions on the protection of the State were not deemed to fulfill, if taken alone, the requirements of the offence of the perversion of the course of justice and a further requirements was to be found in the exceeding of such provisions 47 . The whole jurisprudence of German courts in respect of offences committed under a different legal system by GDR judges and prosecutors has undergone an early and deep critique as to the alleged application of "double standards" in respect of other categories of offences committed under the former "regime" in the GDR 48 . Last reference is mainly to "border guards" held liable for so called "wall shootings" as they were assumed to be obliged (and able) to evaluate, assess and disregard GDR which were grossly illegal and in breach of human rights obligations of the GDR, whilst judges in much more advantageous position (from a cultural view point and due to less time constraints) for a scrutiny of the statutes they were going to apply, apparently benefitted from a positivist approach which is evidently more rooted in judicial than in military and police activity. The restrictive interpretation was also argued with reference to the need to protect the trust judges had in the laws they were applying. legal framework for the sentencing. One of the underlying issues was represented by the difficulties to assert that a perversion of the course of justice can be committed by a prosecutor, as such offence requires that a "decision" has been taken. This makes it easier in respect of a prosecutorial choice to discontinue a proceeding rather than in respect of a dropping of charges and those request which are submitted to the judge. The above mentioned decision considers the dropping of charges as participation in the subsequent offence by the judges which is comprehensible in principle, but questionable when the perversion of the course of the justice is argued based upon an arbitrary and intolerable disproportion between the offence and the sentence. Accordingly, it has been asserted that the dropping of charges may eventually be considered an incitement to pervert the course of the justice, but not as "aiding" the judges in their offence. timeframe in which investigations by the defendant in Djibouti were still ongoing. Jurisdiction was asserted in the French proceeding as the subornation was aimed at mislead, through the creation of a material document (a project of statements to be given), a criminal proceeding in France where the effects were to take place. Perhaps the most significant part of the detailed French judgment pertains to the ascertained lack of justification of the defendant's trip to Brussels with an "official mission" 56 and more specifically with the investigations which were still pending in Djibouti at the time; nor the official, if not judicial, character of the activity is any further detailed in the written and oral proceeds of the case in front of the International Court of Justice.
3.7 Current practice on non criminal sanctions Even if not related with an assertion of criminal jurisdiction, the original list of the individuals targeted with sanctions under the "Magnitsky rule of law accountability act" provides some highlight on the extent of an international scrutiny over judicial activity. Among the reasons initially considered against the involved judges and prosecutors there are the uphelding of arrest and detention without trial, the prolonging of detention upon falsified evidence, the acceptance as true of evidence submitted by security service clearly disproved by other evidence not taken into consideration, the rejection of evidence submitted by the defense counsel in relations to the absence of reasons for the committal to judicial custody, the denial of medical care while in prison, the denial of compliant about gross human rights violations, the harassment of lawyers and in respect o prosecutors, the opening of a "retaliatory prosecution".
The said U.S. Act, determined a Russia response -the Yakovlev Act -by which, besides U.S. officials involved in the detention in Guantanamo, certain judicial and law enforcement people allegedly involved in the violation of the rights of Russian citizens were targeted with sanctions.
Jurisdiction over foreign judges and prosecutors in relation to their judicial activity under general principles
The prohibition to interfere with another State's internal affairs defines in general terms, the external boundaries of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of "official acts" adopted in another State. The said prohibition is increasingly questioned in respect of the eventually internationally illegal character of the said "affairs" and the exception is not linked to the executive or judicial character of the activity.
Judicial activity is essentially territorial, as judges sit and adjudicate almost exclusively within the territory of their State (event if the effects of their activity and decisions may well trespass State borders) and extraterritorial activity is only exceptionally allowed based upon consent of the territorial State. Examples may be found in situations of judicial cooperation when a foreign court is authorized to operate on such Mr. Djama Souleiman Ali, Procureur de la République of Djibouti, and accused in the French proceeding apparently travelled to Brussels at the beginning of 2002 and possibly in December 2001, in order to persuade the former presidential guard, mentioned in footnote n. 49, in the presence of his lawyer, to withdraw the evidence he was to give.
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Judgment, page 43.
territory under Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) or special arrangements for the holding of a trial abroad or when evidence is taken abroad or joint investigations team are set up and also when the activity was not authorized. In respect of unauthorized activity within the territory of another State, the "quasi case" of the Italian Parliamentary inquiry about the "Telekom Serbia Affaire" may be quoted. Under article 82 of the Italian Constitution, Parliamentary inquiry commissions are afforded with the same powers and limits judicial authorities are. During a crossborder activity aimed at the taking of documentary evidence in Lugano, Switzerland, neglecting any request for judicial assistance to the Swiss authorities, a delegation composed by six individuals, among those two "Commissioners" and two escorting police officers, were temporarily taken into custody and subsequently a probe was opened for "prohibited activities at the benefit of a foreign State" under article 271 of the Swiss penal code 57 . The politically embarrassing incident, apart from gossips about ingenuity and wrong legal advice received, didn't have a real judicial follow up.
Situations in which mutual assistance in criminal matters may determine prosecution of those involved, vested with judicial activities in the requesting State are to a certain extent highlighted in an English "precursory" contempt of court case against Australian enforcement officers accused of having broken an undertaking not to transmit -pending an appeal against the warrant granted upon request for mutual assistance -the evidence gathered to the prosecuting authorities in Australia 58 . As one of the enforcement officers happened to be granted with diplomatic immunity and accredited at the High Commission of Australia, the case is best known for its implications in respect of immunity of foreign officials. Nevertheless the case opens new scenarios about implications of undertakings about the use and limits to the use of evidence obtained upon mutual assistance in criminal matters.
Apart from the above situations, judicial activity may candidate for a privileged application of the prohibition of foreign interference, to include judicial proceedings. The international practice mentioned in the previous paragraph shows that most significant cases were judged "territorially" under military occupation regime or at the end of such occupation by the State previously occupied. Even the more recent case in the Borrel Affaire, whereas the conduct took place in a third State, jurisdiction was asserted based upon the territoriality principle and solely the Italian ongoing proceeding mentioned in the present article's premise is based upon the personality principle.
Under principles applicable to functional immunity of officials of a foreign State, perhaps conduct taking place while exercising judicial functions are less probable to be regarded as outside and beyond the breaking point of the said immunities when the conduct is no longer attributable to the State.
Court practice in respect of "judicial immunity" distinguishes for this purpose decisions "in excess of jurisdiction" and decision "in the absence of jurisdiction" whereas a much more generous view is generally expressed in respect of superior courts taking into account implied powers often recognized to such courts. Criminal and civil procedures acknowledge mostly the existence of certain procedural pathologies which deprive certain acts of their attitude as judicial acts and which are far beyond codified irregularities and nullity. As it will be observed in respect of "judicial immunity", restrictive approaches distinguish acts and judgments in excess and without jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it doesn't seem to us that in functional immunity should be metered on categories of procedural pathologies, to include the voidness theory, which are far from being uniformly expressed in different legal systems and further a response to the excessive rigidity of those systems (and only those) in which the res iudicata and the definitive character of judgments bar otherwise subsequent claims based upon the nullity of the decision. If one accepts those theories restricting functional immunity to internationally lawful activities, then it must be admitted that judicial activity is assisted, to some extent, by a presumption of legitimacy.
From a different perspective, if the very purpose of functional immunity of foreign State's officials is to be found in the respect for the concerned State's internal or constitutional organization, then judicial activity is perhaps the most organized and "structured" official activity within each State.
It is nevertheless worth observing that in the Djibouti v. France case decided by the International Court of Justice 59 , the functional immunity claim for the State official vested with prosecutorial function wasn't in any way distinguished from that of the other official discharging its functions in the intelligence and no special circumstances were argued by the applicant State.
4.1 Do judicial activities deserve more international comity? International comity which comprises, in the domestic systems, legally non-binding international practices based upon the principle of reciprocity according to which States act in a way not demeaning foreign States, acts and decisions, has nowadays a great importance in orienting court practice when foreign judicial decisions and judgments are at issue. Reference to international comity has been made for purpose of this paper, to the extent that despite emphasis on the non-binding nature of the practice, the "doctrine of international comity" has become an international law canon applied mainly by U.S. Accordingly, there were no reasons to refer to international comity within general principles except for the fact that it is under the said practice that a special gradient of deference towards foreign judicial activity is shown.
As stated in an ancient English opinion, recalled in respect of comity, natural laws (evidently intending the Law of Nations) requires the "courts of this country to give credit to those of another for the inclination and power to do justice, but not if that presumption is proved to be ill founded in that transaction which is the subject of it"
62 . Under the same doctrine a distinction has been driven, between a suit on a foreign judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, and a suit to recover money which the plaintiff had been compelled to pay under a judgment abroad 63 . It can also be argued that application of what has been distinguished from international comity as "comity of courts" has a center-weight in the subject matter of recognition and reciprocal delimitation of jurisdiction vis à vis the jurisdiction of another State and that foreign judicial proceedings deserve … more comity that foreign executive activities. Accordingly, patterns for international comity are sometimes expressed in reference to the status of the State in whose forum a claim is brought with reference to the duties of a "Responsible participant in an international system of justice"
64 . International comity is mainly invoked in civil matters and despite some recent attempt to exploit its implications in respect of foreign amnesty laws 65 , doesn't per se represent a bar to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction in respect of conduct related with foreign judicial activity if such jurisdiction is established in statutes.
In the subject matter of subpoenas and foreign blocking statutes and decisions, see the U.S. 
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At this purpose, see, U.S. Court of Appeal for the second Circuit, Chevron v. Naranjo, 11-1050L, asserting that a district court cannot issue an injunction that preserves its ability to determine whether a foreign judgment was procured through alleged fraud by U.S. lawyers, whose conduct occurred, at least in part, in this country following the dismissal of an earlier U.S. lawsuit.
Considerations about "comity" apply fully to the "mutual recognition of decisions" within the European Union which -even if expressing a much higher degree of acceptance and assimilation of foreign decisions, isn't a bar to prosecution.
4.2 International corruption as evidence of a "judges exception"? International corruption is since the mid '90s of the last century a matter of major international concern, as an impediment to economic development, and judicial corruption represented a threat to the establishment of the rule of law and the weakening of safeguards against Human rights violations.
The so called "business clause" in the definition of what active and passive corruption may suggest that the provisions of certain Conventions do not cover "judicial corruption", creating some kind of "sanctuary" those vested with judicial activity could benefit from.
The Jurisdictional safeguards are to be found in terms of clear statements that the Conventions do not entitle any State to undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and functions which are reserved which are reserved exclusively to the authorities of that State under its domestic law (UNCAC, art. 4, paragraph 2). What is prevented is accordingly the "long arm of jurisdiction" and so called acts of direct jurisdiction on the territory of another State.
Under the provision of article 42, paragraph 2, of the UNCAC States, may besides their obligation to establish jurisdiction under the territoriality principle, to establish as criteria the commission of the offense by one of its nationals (lett. b), but also the active personality principle and also the commission of the offence against one of its nationals (lett. a) or the State party (lett. d).
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention against Corruption 69 and in the Council of the European Union Convention on the fight against Corruption involving officials of the European Community or officials of Member States of the European Union 70 , both requiring Member States (respectively articles 17 and 7) to establish, besides the territoriality principle, the active personality principle in respect of conduct abroad of citizens reasonably engaged in active corruption and also in respect of conduct of its officials, granting organic jurisdiction in situations of "passive corruption" of public officials, but not exclusively and in any case in a way addressing jurisdiction in general terms and not specifically in reference to judges. The first of the above mentioned Conventions, as well as the African Union Convention tolerate extension of jurisdiction under domestic law (respectively articles 17 and 5).
Interestingly, broad jurisdictional links are established in an ambit in which immunity official immunities of foreign officials seems not to be a matter. Immunities are nevertheless recalled in the said context by considerando n. 7 of the UNCAC in respect of bribery of officials of international organizations, to include the United Nations. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 71 (which does not expressively include holders of judicial offices amongst public officials) seems to disjoin corruption and immunities by stating that immunities "granted to public officials shall not be an obstacle to the investigation of allegations against and the prosecution of such officials" (art. 7, paragraph 5). In the same perspective article 30, paragraph 2, of UNCAC requires each State party to make a balance between immunities and judicial privileges of their officials under domestic law, and the need to investigate and prosecute corruption. Finally, article 11, of the said Convention recalls "judicial independence" as a value to take in consideration in the adoption of measures strengthening integrity and preventing corruption.
In our knowledge there is not yet practice about exercise of criminal jurisdiction in respect of passive foreign judicial corruption. Nevertheless, the impressive legal framework about international corruption, once disjoined from the strict link to international business transactions, isn't evidence for any special treatment for judicial corruption. From a pragmatic point of view, States has shown reluctant to extend their criminal jurisdiction over "passive corruption" of foreign officials, even in specific legal cooperation contexts and only exceptionally criminal provisions extend to foreign officials taking bribes 72 . When this happens, jurisdiction is conditioned to territoriality of the conduct, or (subsequent) presence of the author of the offence in the territory, and further subject to coordination mechanisms.
Recently a investigation in the United States led to the arrest and extradition from Colombia of an administrative assistant within the Attorney General's Office in Bogota allegedly accepting bribes from a former prosecutor and then defense counsel in order to obtain access to classified U.S. Law Enforcement information, to include requests for extradition of narcotic traffickers 73 . The investigations moved not from the perspective of an attempt to compromise the judicial process by "obstructing justice" in the United States and thus of substantial impact on investigations in the said Country 74 .
Further predicates against prosecution specifically related to judicial activity?
In this paragraph we will briefly focus on specific aspects of international law and principles of criminal law which may justify what we perceive as a self-restraint by judges and prosecutors in adjudicating the criminal consequences of foreign judicial activities.
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An example can be found in the Swiss penal code, whose article 322 septies, paragraph 2, reads 
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The indictment, retrieved June 6, 2013, from http://www.nylj.com/nylawyer/adgifs/decisions/052313indictment.pdf refer to 18 U.S.C. § 1512 … and cautiously to the "extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Unites States" and 18 U.S.C. § 3228.
5.1 Do "judicial independence" and "judicial immunity" have an international reach beyond its constitutional purpose?
In each legal system there is at least the possibility to prosecute judges and prosecutors for criminal offences, eventually subject to special safeguards. Constitutional requirements, may vary from none to special leave to lift eventual judicial immunity by the executive, judicial councils or higher jurisdictions, to a reserve of jurisdiction in favor of higher jurisdictions and/or special judicial bodies. But what are the implications at the international level?
International principles on judicial independence have been developed on the consideration that an independent judiciary is an effective safeguard against human rights violations. The principle is recalled and invoked with a frequency and not objected as such which may represent an evidence for the universally acceptance of the principle.
The Under the same principles, the "independence of the Judiciary requires that [...] the Judiciary has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all issues of a justifiable nature" (principle n. 3). Principle n. 1 clearly states "the independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country" and that "it is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary".
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